The prospect of US President Donald Trump engineering a reverse-Kissinger policy has resurfaced. However, such intent seems doubtful, and its success even more so. Instead, India should brace for a more plausible scenario – a reverse-Acheson strategy. Let me explain.
In this new age of hyper-realism, Trump could be wooing Russia as a geopolitical gambit aimed at China. Such a scenario is known colloquially as ‘reverse-Kissinger’ because it mirrors American diplomat Henry Kissinger’s anti-Soviet wooing of Communist China in the early 1970s, but with the subjects reversed. A similar possibility was alluded to during Trump’s last term in office. However, some analysts suspect that ‘this time it could be more real’. After all, such a theory would so elegantly explain Trump’s surprising moves in Europe and toward Russia.
In this story, Trump is giving Russia respect and strategic concessions to woo Russia as an ally against China in the medium to long term. The US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s description of the world order as ‘multipolar’ is then intellectual preparation (or permission) for playing such nimble 19th century-esque balancing games. A President who sees the world as a function of inducements and threats in the forms of ‘cards’ could be tempted to play the Russia ‘card’ against a seemingly unstoppable China. Russia switching sides in the ongoing new cold war would be an enormous prize.
No other country would welcome such a development more than India. In one fell swoop, such an eventuality resolves many of India’s foreign policy conundrums. Its historical and future strategic partners would join the same camp against its long-term security adversary. Besides, if such a gameplan is in the works then India needs to be more assured vis-à-vis Trump and put greater trust in his diplomacy.
However, this story is extremely unlikely for three interrelated reasons. It is a bad bet for Russia, the present power balance does not favour it and the historical analogy is misleading. Moreover, Trump’s actions indicate that he could be more interested in a three-power condominium aimed at enhancing the US’ leverage and flexibility.
Bad bet for Russia
Russia is aware that Trump’s interest in cultivating Russia vis-à-vis China could be just that – Trump’s interest. This has been stated in clear terms by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov himself, and much to the dismay of American realists. He also emphasised that Russia does not betray and abandon its ‘friends’ – perhaps a dig at the US. Despite the rhetoric on friendships between nations, Lavrov’s position is entirely logical. There is much less certainty that a different administration in the US would not reverse Trump’s pro-Russia tilt. Why would Russia choose to be an American proxy against a much stronger China when it had accused and targeted Ukraine for choosing to become the same kind of proxy?
The Russia-China relationship is far more pragmatic and economically interdependent (more Russian dependence) today than it had been during the heydays of the Cold War. Besides, it is also shaped by the understanding in both capitals that it was the US that was the ultimate victor when the two Eurasian powers competed against each other during the last two decades of the Cold War.
Despite the present moment of triumph in Moscow, it’s noteworthy that Russia is yet to subdue Ukraine after three years—a population and territory 1/25th (roughly) the size of China. During Kissinger 1.0, China could tacitly rely on the deterrence effect of the US’ lead over the Soviet Union to undertake its own balancing steps. During various conversations, the former Chairperson of the Communist Party of China Mao Zedong sought to persuade the US to increase and expand its geopolitical influence all over Eurasia. In contrast, Trump 2.0 is downsizing the US military and strategic influence to focus on domestic economic and manufacturing growth. Under such conditions, it is hard to see why Moscow would take on such a serious gamble with such thin assurances and inducements.
Also read: Trump-induced Europe crisis of today is India’s crisis tomorrow
Weak analogy
What form of inducements will Trump offer to Russia at a time when the US strategic reach across the world appears to be winding down? When Kissinger 1.0 was being engineered, the US commanded a large power advantage over the Soviet Union and the conventional military balance between the Soviets and the People’s Republic of China was not significantly wide – especially operationally. Furthermore, the gap between China and the Soviet Union was only expected to close in the coming years and decades. Hence, the Kissingerian logic had an ally in time.
China had already started militarily preparing to balance the Soviet Union by 1964. Having the US on its side was additional reinforcement. Kissinger 1.0 had to wait until China-Soviet relations took a vicious turn in the late 1960s – culminating in competitive mobilisation toward each other’s frontiers, border clashes over disputed territory as well as a nuclear scare. Kissinger merely piggybacked on these realities, instead of creating them. Trump does not have the same materials (so to speak) to work with. One could argue that China played the US ‘card’ as deftly as Washington ‘played’ China. In the present circumstances, both Moscow and Beijing are keen to prevent the shadow of military competition from entering their relationship in the Far East. This could change in the future, but there are no indications of the same yet.
In essence, the reverse-Kissinger gambit is unlikely and it is less than clear that it is under serious consideration in the White House. If such a prospect was on the cards, India and Japan would have to be consulted and included in the plan since Russia alone cannot counterbalance China in the medium to long term. Are there signs in Trump’s policy toward these two democratic powers in Asia that such a plan is in motion? So far, none.
Practicality of reverse-Acheson
What is perhaps more likely is a shallower form of cooperation between Washington and Moscow within a trilateral format that includes Beijing. This could take place in the domain of nuclear talks (as mentioned by Trump) and in search of a new consensus aimed at limiting a new nuclear arms race. Such a format could also establish top-leadership-level channels of communication to manage crises or ease power transition in various regions of Eurasia. This is how, after all, Russia and China have managed their competing interests in Central Asia. The three powers, then, in ‘concert’ could achieve power shifts in various theaters (from the South China Sea to the Middle East) without the risks and costs of more frontal collisions.
In this vision, China would perhaps pause its more blatant forms of expansionism out of respect for Trump’s more conciliatory attitude toward Beijing’s status/security interests. This process will require the great three to explore convergences vis-à-vis third countries. Think North Korea, Iran, Taiwan, Japan, and perhaps even India. After all, Trump had indicated that he could help in defusing the stand-off at the LAC and that achieving the same would help in overall demilitarisation (mainly nuclear) between the US, Russia, and China.
This scenario can be termed Reverse-Acheson because the US Secretary of State, Dean Gooderham Acheson, and his policy ideas have had a lasting impact on US grand strategy since 1945. Simply put, the strategy has been to establish alliances with weaker powers in Eurasia to balance the strongest continental power. What may occur now is its reverse – cooperation with the large continental powers (Russia and China) to manage security crises in various regions. Convictions related to American decline may have persuaded Washington that the continued protection of allies is a strategic objective no longer sustainable in terms of costs and risks. Why keep playing a losing card game?
If the US significantly reduces its role in Eurasia and its surrounding waters, it’s reasonable to assume that the shared hostility binding Moscow and Beijing against Washington would weaken. This could re-inject greater flexibility in great power politics, allowing the US to find more common causes to align with each rival than they do with each other. The gains from this could be real in various areas, but it falls short of the game-changing vision implied in a reverse-Kissinger scenario.
India cannot hold on to the optimistic prospect of a reverse-Kissinger plan being in motion underneath the present US policy moves toward Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. A reverse-Acheson approach is still not a given. The present administration could decide to hold on to US preponderance and its still-continuing benefits. But it is far more realistic and possible than a reverse-Kissinger scenario. Indian strategic analysts and political leadership need to think through various mitigation and adaptation strategies in case the latter appears ever more imminent or likely.
Any move toward a reverse-Acheson approach will likely come at some cost to India’s famed ‘sweet spot’ – an enormous leverage that New Delhi has enjoyed since Independence. India has some time on its side. A reverse-Acheson strategy could be attempted but its success relies on China and Russia playing ball – which is far from certain. The last time Trump attempted a wedge strategy was in 2018-2019 concerning China’s relations with North Korea. The gambit only brought the two powers closer to each other eventually, with the bonus of legitimisation for North Korea’s nuclear status.
Sidharth Raimedhi is a Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR), a New Delhi-based think tank. He tweets @SRaimedhi. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)
Have always felt India is old enough to handle its issues with China entirely on its own. We are not Ukraine, of course, but there is a lesson there for everyone.